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JUDGE MARSHA S. BERZON 
As judges of the geographically largest and busiest federal circuit 
court of appeals, the 26 active and 22 senior Ninth Circuit judges1 rarely 
have the luxury of looking back at the cases we have decided, rather than 
working on the opinions yet to be written and preparing for the new 
cases coming up for argument.  That the Golden Gate University Law 
Review has for so many years (since Volume 6 in 1976) produced this 
annual volume documenting and analyzing our work product has been 
essential in filling the gap by providing an objective assessment of what 
– and how – we are doing as we strive both to do justice in individual 
cases and to provide guidance to lawyers and litigants for future 
litigation. 
The popular media, in contrast, rarely says much of substance about 
the dispositions we work so hard to turn out, instead devoting itself to 
counting the Supreme Court reversal rate and reflexively labeling our 
court – inaccurately, as the opinions chosen for this survey indicate2 – 
uniformly “liberal” and “out of the mainstream.”3  In fact, the judges of 
the Ninth Circuit are a wildly diverse lot, and we produce opinions that 
reflect that diversity.  Which brings me to the topic I would like briefly 
to explore in this Introduction: The Ninth Circuit en banc process, which 
is our effort to create some uniformity when the diversity has gotten out 
of hand and resulted in conflicting opinions, intra- or, sometimes, inter-
circuit.  Through the en banc process, we hear unusually important cases 
  1There are 29 authorized judgeships for the Ninth Circuit, but 3 are currently vacant.  Of 
the senior judges, 18 sit regularly on cases.  Because this complement of judges is not nearly enough 
to hear and decide the approximately 6,324 cases on which we had full-merits briefing in 2010, we 
had 185 visiting judges – district judges from the Ninth Circuit and district and circuit judges from 
elsewhere – helping us out by sitting on panels.  (Absent an emergency, no three-judge panel can 
have more than one visiting judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), and visiting judges do not participate in en 
banc votes or sit on en banc panels.) 
 2 See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 3 See, e.g., John Schwartz, ‘Liberal’ Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2010, A33. 
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in panels more representative of the court as a whole than the usual 
three-judge panels. 
The trigger for this modest project is that in two of the three Ninth 
Circuit cases covered in this volume, there was a call for en banc 
consideration, one directly and one in a predecessor case, each of which 
generated not one but two dissents from denial of en banc consideration.4  
So it is worth considering why and how cases are called en banc in our 
court, and why and how the practice of publishing dissents from (and, 
more recently, concurrences in) denial of en banc rehearing developed 
and burgeoned. 
I begin with the why and how of en banc consideration: 
First off, given its size, the Ninth Circuit long ago faced the fact 
that, unlike other federal circuits, we cannot as a practical matter have 
the court as a whole sit en banc.  An argument with 29 judges on a panel 
would not allow lawyers to get a word in edgewise.  (Many lawyers feel 
as though they rarely do anyway, even with our current partial en banc 
system.)  And drafting, circulating, and voting on en banc opinions with 
a bench that large would stretch out the decision-making process 
indefinitely – which, again, some lawyers maintain is already the case. 
So, when the size of the Ninth Circuit was expanded in 1978 from 
13 to 23 judges,5 Congress also authorized any circuit of more than 15 
active judges to use a partial en banc court, with the size of the partial en 
banc panels to be chosen by the circuit.6  The Ninth Circuit was the first, 
and is still the only, court to take advantage of this permission.7  We (I 
use the term “we” as members of the court usually do when speaking of 
court decisions, although I was not on the court at the time) had a 
mathematically savvy law clerk figure out the smallest number of judges 
that would fairly accurately reflect the diversity of views on the court the 
great majority of the time, and came up with eleven judges; that number 
was later confirmed as adequate by others with statistical expertise.  We 
nonetheless – largely for appearance’s sake, because lay people tend not 
to believe that less than half the active judges can be adequately 
 4 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 
2003) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Newdow, 328 F.3d at 482 
(McKeown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 5 See The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3(a), 92 Stat 1629, 1632; 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006). 
 6 See The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, § 6 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41 note, 46(c)).  
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits are the only other circuits that currently qualify for limited en banc 
panels.  See 28 U.S.C. § 44. 
 7 See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
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representative – did experiment for a short while with fifteen-judge en 
banc panels.  But the larger panels were unwieldy during argument and 
prone to delay during the opinion-writing process.8  We later went back 
to the eleven-judge system. 
It is theoretically possible under our system to have a full-court en 
banc after a partial en banc panel decides a case.9  But such full-court en 
bancs have been “called” by judges on the court only a handful of 
times,10 and no such call has succeeded.11 
I’ve often thought that the partial en banc system is integral to 
making our process for deciding which cases to take en banc – the part of 
the en banc process I’ll focus on here – work.  The reason is that the en 
banc panel is “pulled” at random, literally and in somewhat retro fashion, 
by pulling balls with judges’ names on them from an old jury box.  (The 
draw is among the non-recused active judges and any senior-judge 
members of the original three-judge panel who choose to be in the pool 
from which the en banc panel is drawn).12  So, unlike in other circuits, 
when we vote on whether to “go” en banc, we do not know the 
composition of the panel that will ultimately hear the case.  As a result, 
the decision on whether to hear a case en banc cannot be simply a trial 
vote on the likely outcome of the case once taken en banc, and is more 
likely to reflect the considerations that are supposed to govern whether a 
 8 The 11-judge limited en banc procedure was first adopted by rule in 1979.  See 9TH CIR. 
R. 35-3 (1979).  Effective January 1, 2006, the limited en banc panels had 15 judges.  See 9TH CIR. 
R. 35-3 (2006).  On July 1, 2007, however, the rule was revised once more to return to the 11-judge 
system.  See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (2007). 
 9 See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“In appropriate cases, the Court may order a rehearing by the full 
court following a hearing or rehearing en banc.”); 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 5.8. 
 10 See Abebe v. Holder, 577 F.3d 1113, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc by the full court); United States v. Orso, 275 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 
2001) (Trott, J., dissenting from an order rejecting a sua sponte call for rehearing by the full court); 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1996) (individual dissents 
from an order rejecting a sua sponte call for rehearing by the full court by Judges O’Scannlain and 
Trott); Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc by the full court); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 889–91 (1980) 
(individual dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc by the full court by Judges B. Fletcher, 
Pregerson, and Ferguson). 
 11 According to Professor Arthur Hellman, former Chief Judge James R. Browning strongly 
opposed the first call for the full court to rehear a case decided by a limited en banc panel.  See A 
Celebration Honoring James R. Browning, 63 MONT. L. REV. 251, 262–66 (2002) (remarks of 
Arthur Hellman).  Although he likely disagreed with the en banc decision, and while emphasizing 
that he “d[id] not question for one minute . . . [the requesting judge’s] absolute right to call for the 
vote,” Chief Judge Browning urged his colleagues to vote against the call for the good of the Court, 
explaining that otherwise the experiment with the limited en banc process would fail. Id. at 265 
(quoting a previously-confidential memorandum of Chief Judge Browning).  Chief Judge 
Browning’s position won out. 
 12 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 & 35-3 circuit advisory committee’s note 2. 
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case is worthy of en banc consideration – namely, the importance of the 
case, and whether it conflicts with Supreme Court cases, other cases 
from our court, or cases from other circuits.13 
Here, in brief outline, is how we decide whether to “go” en banc: 
Any judge of the court, senior judges included, can “call” a case en banc, 
following a prescribed time schedule I’ll not go into here.14  The en banc 
call can follow the submission of a petition for rehearing en banc, or it 
can be “sua sponte” by a judge or judges.  All parties will always have a 
chance to comment before we have a vote whether to go en banc.15  As a 
matter of tradition but not rule, a dissenting judge on a panel will usually 
not be the person to make the en banc call, the theory being that unless 
someone other than the one dissenting judge thinks the case worthy of en 
banc rehearing, the “call” is unlikely to succeed.  Occasionally, three-
judge panels as a whole decide to call a case en banc, either before or 
after publishing an opinion, because they discover an intracircuit conflict 
or a conflict of our precedent with that of the Supreme Court or of other 
circuits.  Because of our size, we tend to be quite scrupulous about not 
allowing three-judge panels to change the law of the circuit unless there 
is a squarely on-point Supreme Court case,16 so there are a certain 
number of “housekeeping” en bancs, designed only to harmonize Ninth 
Circuit case law that, usually inadvertently, is in conflict, even if on 
fairly minor points. 
Once there’s an en banc “call,” we have a vigorous internal 
exchange of memorandum about whether the case should be heard en 
banc.  These memoranda are, in many ways, the most interesting and 
best work we do on cases – impassioned, detailed, sometimes deeply 
analytical – even though the products are for internal consumption only 
(except as they sometimes morph into dissent from denial of en banc, a 
subject I’ll explore shortly).  Apparently – and I say this only from 
discussions with judges on other circuits – this writing of extensive, 
thoughtful memoranda before deciding whether to go en banc is not 
always undertaken in other circuits, and is, in my view, a great strength 
of our system.  By the time a case is actually taken en banc, which 
 13 See FED. R. APP. P. 35.  The former Fifth Circuit went en banc if a substantial minority of 
the court voted to do so, but the current Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not allow this 
procedure.  See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active 
service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or 
reheard by the court of appeals en banc.”). 
 14 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 & 35-3 circuit advisory committee’s note 2. 
 15 9TH CIR. R. 35-2. 
 16 See Hulteen v. AT&T Corp, 498 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), rev’d on other 
grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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requires the vote of a majority of non-recused active judges,17 the issues 
possibly meriting en banc consideration have been thoroughly aired, to 
the great advantage of the en banc panel eventually drawn. 
So how often are cases called en banc, and how often do the en banc 
calls succeed?  In the last ten years, since I’ve been on the court (I was 
confirmed in March, 2000), we have heard between 13 and 25 cases en 
banc annually, out of between 32 and 47 en banc calls each year.  The 
percentage of en banc calls that have been successful has varied between 
about one-third to just over one-half.  These statistics can be gleaned 
from public information, as orders denying en banc rehearing report 
whether there was a vote of the whole court concerning en banc 
rehearing18 – and, of course, a grant of rehearing en banc speaks for 
itself.  We do not, however, as some circuits do,19 announce either the 
numerical vote whether to go en banc or the judges voting either way; 
indeed, judges are not given the choice to record their votes in the order 
denying en banc rehearing, although the burgeoning practice of 
publishing dissents from denial of en banc provides the same opportunity 
to some degree. 
Whether we should change the practice of not publicly recording en 
banc votes in the order granting or denying en banc rehearing is a matter 
members of the court have debated.20  Favoring our current practice is 
the consideration that a recorded vote for or against en banc review could 
be misunderstood as a vote on the merits rather than a vote on the 
question of further review.  There is also the related concern that as 
judges we ordinarily explain why we do what we do if our names are 
attached to a decision, triggering the concern that some judges would feel 
compelled to explain their vote if it were recorded.  Moreover, judges 
may decide to vote for or against en banc consideration for reasons not in 
any respect substantive, such as the quality of the lawyering or whether 
the facts of the case present the underlying issue well; recording such 
reasons, legitimate though they are with regard to the exercise of 
discretionary jurisdiction, could be untoward, while concealing them in 
favor of less candid explanations would not advance transparency in the 
 17 If an eligible judge does not vote on an en banc call, the vote is recorded as a “no” vote, 
see 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 5.5(b), except in death penalty cases in which execution is imminent, in 
which a failure to vote is recorded as a “yes” vote, see 9TH CIR. R. 22-4(d)–(e). 
 18 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 & 35-3 circuit advisory committee’s note 2. 
 19 See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 35(b) (order denying rehearing en banc reflects the vote of each 
participating judge); see also D.C. CIR. R. 35;  7th Cir. Internal Operating Procedure 5(d) (order 
denying rehearing en banc reflects which judges voted to grant rehearing, if they wish). 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Koon, 45 F.3d 1303, 1308-10 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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en banc process.  Finally, there is the consideration that exposing the 
vote count, either numerically or by name, would put pressure on the 
option to abstain and have the vote counted – in most instances, as a no 
vote – according to our automatic attribution rules.  In other words, 
judges might feel obliged to vote either yes or no, when they would 
rather not vote at all – for example, so as to avoid the appearance of pre-
commitment on the issues should the case go en banc.  Abstention could 
be understood as not participating, when that is not exactly what it is, 
given the rule that a non-vote usually counts as a no vote.  One option to 
deal with this latter concern would be recording, numerically or by name, 
only “yes” votes in the ordinary, non-death penalty case covered by the 
“no” default rule, and only “no” votes in death penalty cases covered by 
the “yes” vote default rule. 
Weighing against these considerations are others some members of 
our court have found compelling:21  Preeminent is the concern that 
secrecy in the form of lack of attribution in judicial decision-making on 
important decisional matters is generally unacceptable, as judges should 
be accountable for their decisions on cases.  Further, for purposes of 
petitions for writ of certiorari, the actual vote whether to go en banc may 
be influential for the Supreme Court in deciding how important or 
debatable a case is.  For instance, a lopsided no vote may be viewed 
differently from an evenly split vote, although both result in denial of en 
banc and would be recorded identically under our present system in the 
order denying rehearing en banc.  Exposing the vote would demonstrate 
to the public the impact of court vacancies; provide information about 
the performance of individual judges that could be useful should that 
judge be considered for a Supreme Court appointment; and may give 
some sense of voting patterns useful to students of the judicial process.22 
To those considerations I would add that if en banc review is 
granted – I would assume that vote recording would have to be 
symmetrical and so apply to grants as well as denials of en banc review – 
recording the vote would provide some information to the litigants 
preparing for en banc argument.  True, reading the tealeaves would 
require sophistication.  Given the various reasons for granting en banc 
review, the actual reason could well be, for example, an irreconcilable 
intracircuit conflict, not the merits of the issue.  But the litigants familiar 
with the case will have some idea concerning the reason for grant of en 
banc rehearing, and so may infer that an overwhelming vote to hear a 
case en banc signals a likelihood that either the three-judge panel opinion 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. 
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or prior precedent is likely to be overturned, absent some clarifying 
advocacy.  A less lopsided vote could suggest that the outcome is in no 
way presaged, especially given our partial en banc system. 
We come, finally, to the most recent innovations in our en banc 
procedure: the practice of recording dissents from denial of en banc, and 
the countervailing emergence of concurrences in denial of en banc.  To 
provide, once again, some numbers: When I started on the court, in 2000, 
there were 5 dissents from denial of en banc, from among 24 denials of 
en banc rehearing after a vote, and no concurrences in denial of en banc.  
In 2010, there were 16 dissents from denial of en banc, among 27 denials 
following a vote, and 5 concurrences.  In the first five years I was on the 
court, never did more than half the denials of en banc result in published 
dissents from denial of en banc; and overall, slightly less than 40% of 
denials of rehearing en banc resulted in a dissent.  In the next six years, 
2005 through 2010, at least 55% of denials each year resulted in a 
dissent, and over that period as a whole, 62.5% of denials were 
accompanied by dissents.23  And, to keep up with the dissent trend, the 
practice of publishing concurrences in denial of en banc, largely 
countering arguments made in the dissents from denial that did not 
appear in the three-judge panel opinion or any dissent therefrom, has 
grown as well, albeit more modestly.  From 2000 through 2004, about 
9% of cases with dissents from denials of en banc also had concurrences; 
over the following six years, that number was 22.5%.24 
Why have these practices grown, and what is to be made of that 
growth?  For one thing, there has been some indication from members of 
the Supreme Court that they find the dissents useful in deciding whether 
to take cases on certiorari.  The dissents, it has been said, inform the 
Supreme Court of the importance of an issue and of arguments favoring 
one side or the other that have not theretofore appeared in print.  Further, 
as noted, the dissents are often relatively easy to produce, given the 
lengthy memoranda that have already been exchanged among the judges 
debating the propriety of en banc consideration.  A final consideration 
favoring the new tradition of dissents from denial of en banc is the same 
one favoring recording votes on en banc calls – transparency for the 
public.25 
Countering this consideration is the accusation – one of them mine26 
 23 Internal Court Compilation by Maria Daquipa (Feb. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See generally Indraneel Sur, How Far Do Voices Carry: Dissents from Denial of 
Rehearing En Banc, 2006 WIS. L. REV 1315. 
 26 See Defenders of Wildlife Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 402 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (Berzon, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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– that the dissents sometimes read, inappropriately, like petitions for 
writs of certiorari.  The suggestion underlying such observations is that 
advocacy for further review is inappropriate for judges of our court, who 
should be upholding our decision-making processes once they are 
completed rather than seeking intervention from the Supreme Court.  
Moreover, the time spent on dissents from denials of en banc, and 
concurrences as well, might, some argue, be better spent working on the 
new cases gathering on our desks.  And the transparency consideration 
favoring the dissents is countered by the observation that the appearance 
of transparency is a mirage: Many judges who vote to grant en banc do 
not join dissents from denial of en banc, either generally as a matter of 
principle or in the individual case – because, for example, their reasons 
for voting to grant en banc were not the same as those of the judge 
writing the dissent, or because they do not consider the case of sufficient 
importance to merit a dissent from denial of en banc.  Finally, those 
judges uncomfortable with the recent notion that dissents from denial of 
en banc are almost de rigeur point to the overblown appearance of 
internal dissension and disarray created by such dissents.  In fact, such 
dissents appear in a tiny percentage of the cases we work on as a court, 
and convey a degree of criticism of our colleagues’ work we tend to 
avoid outside of this medium. 
From 2000 through 2010, there were 125 dissents from denial of 
rehearing en banc in our court.27  Petitions for writs of certiorari have 
been filed with the Supreme Court in 83 of those 125.  As of this writing, 
9 of those petitions remain pending, and in another case there is still time 
to file a petition.  Of the 74 cases with adjudicated certiorari petitions, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 33 – a 44.6% rate. 
There is, of course, a selection bias in these numbers: the cases 
important enough to elicit dissents from denial of en banc consideration 
are also likely to be good candidates for grant of petition for writ of 
certiorari on their merits.  But I doubt that’s the whole story.  Some of 
the dissents from denial of en banc create the appearance of seriously 
wayward decision-making by the panel majority even when that is not 
the case, or at least not any more so than in many other cases in which, 
for one reason or another, no member of the court has chosen to call for 
en banc rehearing. 
With those considerations in mind, I’ll look quickly at the dissents 
from denial of en banc related to the Pineda-Moreno and Newdow cases 
covered in this year’s Ninth Circuit survey.  I don’t want to trench on the 
substantive commentaries that appear later in this volume, so I’ll 
 27 Internal Court Compilation by Maria Daquipa (Feb. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
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concentrate instead on the kinds of arguments made in the dissents, in an 
effort to see what the writers, and those who joined them, were trying to 
accomplish. 
First up is Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent from denial of en banc 
rehearing in Pineda-Moreno (which I and four other judges joined).28  
Few of us can match Chief Judge Kozinski in writing with passion, 
precision, and humor, using language and allusions accessible to a wide 
audience.  The Pineda-Moreno dissent from denial of en banc, 
concerning a panel opinion with two major Fourth Amendment issues, is 
a masterpiece of Chief Judge Kozinski’s oeuvre. 
The dissent begins with the warning that “1984 may have come a bit 
later than predicted, but it’s here at last,”29 goes on to maintain that “poor 
people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all the gadgets of 
the wealthy for ensuring it,”30 accuses the panel opinion of 
“unselfconscious cultural elitism,”31 and of approving “something creepy 
and un-American,”32 and ends with the assessment that unless the panel 
opinion is reconsidered, “the consequences for ourselves and our 
children may be dire and irreversible.”33  At the same time, Chief Judge 
Kozinski provided more traditional legal analysis concerning why the 
case met our en banc criteria, maintaining that the panel opinion conflicts 
with Supreme Court case law and a recent D.C. Circuit case.  So Chief 
Judge Kozinski’s dissent was directed both at provoking public 
discussion about where we are going as a society with regard to privacy 
protection generally and at providing a basis for granting Supreme Court 
review on certiorari.  (Judge Reinhardt also wrote a dissent from denial 
of rehearing en banc in the same case for himself alone, also bemoaning, 
albeit much more briefly, a perceived demise in the protections accorded 
by the Fourth Amendment.34) 
It’s worth noting that there was no panel dissent in Pineda-Moreno, 
so, without the dissents from denial of en banc, neither the dire 
assessments about the general direction of Fourth Amendment law nor 
the more technical arguments about why the case merited en banc review 
would have been given voice.  Beyond that, though, I suppose one’s 
assessment of Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent is very much in the eyes of 
 28 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 29 Id. at 1121. 
 30 Id. at 1123. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 1126. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1126-27 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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the beholder: Will such an engaging and passionate opinion actually 
capture popular concern about the installation of GPS systems on cars in 
driveways?  What is likely to come of such concern?  Would the 
Supreme Court likely have missed the asserted conflict with a D.C. 
Circuit case were it not flagged in a dissent from denial of en banc 
rehearing?  For myself, having not succeeded in discouraging the 
publication of such dissents as a routine matter, I have taken to deciding 
on a case-by-case basis whether to join particular dissents from denial of 
rehearing en banc, as my joining Chief Judge Kozinski in Pineda-
Moreno indicates. 
The first Ninth Circuit Newdow opinion, which struck down as an 
Establishment Clause violation the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
with its “under God” phrase, in public school classrooms, was eventually 
heard by the Supreme Court and reversed on standing grounds.35  Before 
that reversal, however, Judge O’Scannlain of our court, joined by five 
colleagues, published a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc 
restricted to the merits of the Establishment Clause issue.36  (Judge 
McKeown, joined by three other judges – for a total of ten – also 
published a dissent from denial of en banc consideration, albeit one just a 
paragraph long and noting only the “exceptional importance” of the 
issue.37) 
Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from denial, although less colorful in 
its allusions and language, was almost, if not quite, as impassioned as 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s later Pineda-Moreno version: It noted that the 
Newdow panel opinion had “produced a public outcry across the nation,” 
“would make hypocrites out of the Founders,” might invalidate the 
Thanksgiving holiday, and “confers a favored status on atheism in our 
public life.”38  Again like Chief Judge Kozinski, Judge O’Scannlain also 
provided a more traditional legal analysis, pointing out an asserted 
conflict with a Seventh Circuit opinion and Supreme Court opinions, 
while at the same time acknowledging “a lack of clarity in the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause cases generally.”39  Judge O’Scannlain 
concluded by directly inviting Supreme Court review (“Perhaps the 
Supreme Court will have the opportunity to correct the error for us.”40).  
Matters did not play out quite that way, but the ultimate result, after the 
 35 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004). 
 36 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 2003) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 37 Id. at 482 (McKeown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 38 Id. at 472-73, 479, 481 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 39 Id. at 482. 
 40 Id. 
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second Newdow case in the Ninth Circuit, was the one for which Judge 
O’Scannlain and his colleagues fervently argued. 
Unlike the Pineda-Moreno panel opinion, the first Newdow three-
judge panel opinion included a dissent by Judge Fernandez, so at least 
some of the arguments contained in the dissent from denial of rehearing 
en banc were already in the public record.41  And the importance of the 
case was certainly not likely to escape the Supreme Court’s attention, 
given the very public outcry Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent recorded.  Still, 
the dissent did serve as a comprehensive survey of the arguments against 
the original panel opinion, and the ultimate outcome was, perhaps not 
entirely coincidentally, consistent with the dissent.  Overall, although one 
could argue – and I do – that the entire practice of dissents from denial of 
en banc consideration should be eliminated or severely curtailed, since 
that has not happened, the dissent from denial of en banc rehearing in the 
first Newdow case is as effective an example of the medium as we have 
seen. 
The upshot?  I’m not sure.  It seems that asking federal appellate 
judges to refrain from publishing their deeply felt views in favor of 
institutional coherence and finality just does not work.  Still, even with 
the seemingly unstoppable development of the dissent from (and now 
concurrence in) denial of en banc rehearing tradition, our en banc process 
remains vital and essential for a court of our size.  We spend a great deal 
of time on it, perhaps to the detriment of our regular case load, but that’s 
not going to change any time soon.  May we just find enough hours in 
our days – and those of our hardworking law clerks – to continue down 
this path, if that is the one that we are going to be traveling. 
 
 41 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
11
Berzon: Introduction
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
